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PORTENTS OF DISCONTINUANCE
Credit analysis theory is bsa.d on theassumptionthat
sinc, the successof a business enterprise is measured
in pecuniary terms it is posaible todistinguish betwsr
the sound and the unsound, the successfuland the unsuc-
cessful, by examining certain "credit" ratios. / That
is to sly, the theory auumss that if a designated cred-
it ratio falls below or rises above same espisically de-
teredned level - depending on the relationship measured
by the ratio - that deviation signals financial difficul-
ty and even, ifit persists,portend. discontinuanceof
business operations.The data &v*ilable for use in this
stu4permit an experimental tasting of this primary as-
sumption,particularly theassumption thatpersistent
deviation from an empirical norm foretells disappearance
of an enterprise from the business scene. Such a testing
is subjeot to limitation., but it can ascertain whether
in this particular group of corporstions a systematic ra-
tio pattern wee exhibited by thediscontinuingcompanies.
For a test of the type to which this chapter is de-
voted our data should pertain only to the experience of
campaniss that areiomi to havesuffered severe finan-
cial difficultisi resultinginreorganieaticn or failure.
The sample with which we have to work is not, however, of
this character. Strictly speaking, all we laiow is that
these compsnie' ceased filing federal corporateincome
tax returns,Some say have changed to a non-corporate
form of organization, and others way havediscontinued
businessvoluntarily.But we havereason tobelieve that
the majority were what may be termed involuntary discon-
tinuances.
The data on which this chapter is basedweredevel-
oped as follows.The primary samples for our study con-
sisted of a drawing of about 200 eligiblecompanies in
each of the fiveindustriesfrom the 1926 federal incane
tax returns, and of another, ller drawing from the
1930 returns.These companies werethen traced throughPorttRtSof Disco,tj,,1,,c 9,
the files for the succeedingten and six years, respec-
tively.The corporations studied in the foregoing chap-
ters are those from the 1926 '.rawing thatcontinued to
fileincome tax returns through 1936.The remainder
ceased filing returns some time before thatyear, as did
nearly half of the ccmpanieu in the 1930 drawing.Since
companies involved in mergers and consolidations had been
eliminated from the samples, and since federal law re-
quires the filing of an income tax return by every active
corporation, these Companies that ceased filing returns
say be assumed to have gone out of business as corporate
entities. Presumably they were failures,although, as
mentioned above, a few may have left business voluntar-
il.y or changed to a non-corporate form of ownership.
The present analysis is based, therefore, on the re-
turns of compani's that discontinuedafter remainingin
the sample six years or more. Thus it includes, from the
1926 drawing, the com,aniee thatdiscontinued some time
during the years1932-36,and, from the 1930 drawing,the
companies that disappeared in 1936. These discontinuances
n*er 200 in all, distributed among the five industries
as follows:baking47;men' s clothing 41; furniture 38;
stone-clay 43; machine tool 31.They are referred to as
the identical sample of discontinuing companies. While
the sampleis wlfl, it is, to our knowledge, the only
one available for testing, in regard to 11 manufactur-
ing concerns, the basic assumptions ofcredit analysis
theory.
In stwjying the financial statements of enterprises
thatultimatelydisappear fro. the business scene oneof
the meat serious problems is the difficulty of reducing
the tabulations to a basis adapted to temporal analysis.
If all the disappearances occurred in a single year the
problem would notarise,but in the present instance we
are dealing with corporations that disappearedseverally
over aperiod of fiveyears.A tabulation of their f 1-
nancial statements for a series of calendar years before
discontinuance would not permit careful analysis, because
the nuaberof cosiçanies wouldchange from year to year
andin each year acme would be nearer discontinuancethan
others. Therefore -have taken the year of disappearance
asthepoint of reference, regardlessof the particular
calendar year it happens to be, andhavetabulatedthe
financial statements according to the numberof years be-Fi,.iitciiuSeaZZ Corboratjrn
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fore discontiflUanC*. /Thus the statementsof the 200
Companies were grOuped intosix division.,aCCOrdiflgtc
whether theycovered thefirst, second, third, fourth,
fifth or sixth calendar year before the companyj
question left the business scene.The statements in each
ofthese divisions were thenaggregated to yield a compO3..
it. balance sheet andincome account for each of the six
y.ar-beforedi.ccntinuaflce periods. The tabulations could
not be carried beyond the sixth yearbefore disappearance,
for some of the corporations werein the sample only six
year../
FINANCIAL RATIOS AS INDICATORS
In the financial structureof our samplecorpora-
tions there were many .lnts that gave advance evidence
of ultimate discontinuance, but three ratios proved to be
particularly sensitive indicators in this respect:cur-
rent assets to current liabilities, net worth to total
debt,and net working capital2/to total assets. These
threewere selected bythe trial and error method, a
large nier of possible ratios being tested.
The first and third of theseratios reflectthe
"freezingTM of worldng capital, the first by comparing the
two determinant, of working capital with each other, and
the third by comparing the difference between these two
conents with the total assets of the company. The sec-
ond ratio - net worth to total debt - reflects the rela-
tive positians of the owners and creditors in the enter-
prise. When the capital of an enterprise becomes less and
1... liquid, and the creditors' cl&imTM persistin inclSa3-
ing, in relation to the owners' equity, we have what are
hers called portent, of discontinuance. It is significant
that the profit ratio was a lees sensitive and reliable
indicator than any of the three ratio. listed above.In
the present chapter these three "indicator" ratios, com-
puted foreach year before discontinuance, are comparel
with the corresponding ratiosfor the continuing compa-
nies.
In this carison certain obvious difficulties have
had to be surmounted.In the first place, the ratios for
the *zrviving caniss pertain to given calendar years,
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before discontinuance,eachof which represents a
4jfferent assortment of calendaryears. And in the second
place, a changein a ratio between,say, the fifth and
third year before djscontinuancecannot be wholly at-
tributed to the ract thatthe time of disappearancewas
ing nearer:some of the change may have beendue to
. dominance of generally prosperous years in the fifth,
and of generally Unprosperous years in thethird, year
before discontinuance.
A rather crudemeans of solving these problems is
to determine, for the surviving companies, thehigh-low
rings of each ratio' s variationduring allthe years
l92(35.When this method is followedanygivenratio
for the discontinuing companies is not regarded as out of
line until ithas passed outside that ratio's hin-low
range as established by the surviving companies. Por some
purposes of comparison, however, this methodofcorrec-
tion is too conservative, because in relatively prosper-
ous or relatively depressed yearsa ratio for the dis-
continuing companies say be dangerously high or low and
still fall withinthe high-low range for the continuing
corporations.Therefore a standardizing technique has
been applied to the three selected ratios in order to de-
rive, for each of thea, the Nestiaatsd normal," that is,
a ratio for the surviving companies which pertains to the
-combination of calendar years that i.contained in
each year before discontinuance.2/
Although both of these bases of co.parison give con-
sidsration to thecyclical factorthey aes-vedifferent
psrpoees. Th. high-low range indicates the majji cycli-
cal variation andhence is particularly useful in deter-
lining when the levelof the disappearingcompanies' ra-
tio is out of line.The estimated normal allows roughly
for th. cyclical influencesoperativein each given year
before discontinuance, and thus can be used totest the
direction of movement as well asthe level of the disap-
leering companies' ratio.
In Charts 6to 10 the three ratios mentioned above -
rrent aeets to current liabilities, net worth to total
lsbt, and net working capital to total assets -are pro-
ieatsd for the discontinuing companies in each industl7,
md for each year before discontinuance, and are compared




ING CORPORATIONS:Three Selected Pa-
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continuance
a
on Table D-2 in AppendixD and
Table 8-22 In Data Book see footnote
16 of Chapter II.
bweightaverage of thecontinuing
companies' ratios for the various cal-
endar years contained in each year be-
fore disontlnu*flcStomethod of es-
timate see Appendix D.
CRange of1926-35annualratios for
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aR$S.dOfl Table 0-2 in Aopendix 0 and
Table 6-23in Data Book (see footnote
16 of Chapter I).
bWeighted average ofthe continuing
companies' ratios for the various cal-
endar years contained in each year be-
fore discontinuance; for riiethodofes-
timate seeppeniix D.
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CBased on Table 0-2In Appendix 0 and
Table 8-24in Data Book(see footnote
16 of Chapter I).
bw,ightd average of thecontinuing
companies' ratios forthe varIouS cat-
indar years containedin each year be-
fore discontinuance;for method of es-
timate see Appendix 0.
CRange of 1926-35annualratiosicr
sample of continuing companies.
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38 DISCONTINUING AND 66 CONTINUINGFUR..
NITURE CORPORATIONS: Three SelectedRi-
tos,by Number of Years Before Dis-
contlnuarc.
1Based on Table D-2in Appendix 0 and
Table 8-24in Data Book(see footnote
16 of Chapter I).
bight.daverage of theC0fltinuig
cpanies' ratios for the variouscal-
endar years Containedin each year be-
fore discontinuance;for method of es-
timate see Appendix 0.
CRange of1926-35annualratiosfor
sample of continuing companies.
p0CHART
43 DISCONTINUINGAND 70 CONTINUING
STONE AND CLAY CORPORATIONS:Three
Selected Ratios,by Number of Years
BeforeDiscontinuance a
a Basedon Table 0-2in Appendx 0
and Table 8-25 in Data Booksee foot-
note 16 of Chapter II.
bightedaverage of the continuing
companies' ratiosforthevariouscal-
endar years contained ineachyearbe-
forediscontinuance;for method of
estimate see Appendix 0.
CRange of1926-35 annual ratios for
sample of continuing compdnies.
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31 DISCONTINUINGAND MB CONTINUING
MACHINE TOOL CORPORATIONS: Three
Selected Ratios, by Nubetof Years
Before Discont InuanCea
CBased on Table 0-2 in Appendix D
aridTable B-26inData BookIsee
note 16 of Chapter Ii.
bweightedaverage of the continu-
ing companies' ratios for the vari-
ous calendar years Contained in each
yearbeforediscontinuance; for
mthod of estimate see Appendix 0.
CRange ofl926-3annualratios








































tabliShed bythe surviving companiesover the period 1926-
35,,9/Prom these charts itcali be observed that except
in men's clothing allthree ratios were below the esti-
.ated normal as early as the s.xthyear before discontin- cs.And in three of theindustries they were out of jne thatearly even if we adopt thevery conseavatie
standard of the high-low range for thecontinujncompa-
nies; hare machine tool and again men's c]othine are the
exceptions.
Equally significant is the movement ofthe d.iscon-.
tinuthg companies' ratios as the year of discontinuance
draws near. In all five industries they declinedper-
sistently, in most instances sharply, from the sixthtc
the first year before discontinuance, thereby increasing
their divergence from the estimated normal. Forthe five
industries combined thisincreasing divergence is found
to bestatistically significant:in each ofthe three
ratios the probabilitythat chance alonewould account
for this persistent divergence is less than one out of a
hundred./
Of the three ratios shown in Charts 6 to 10, that of
net working capital to total assets provides the most def-
inite indications of ultimate discontinuance./In each
industryits downward movement was sharp - more so than
that of either of the other ratios - and virtually unin-
terrupted.It. was the only one of the three to fall de-
cisively below thehigh-low range in the men' s clothing
sample.In the stone-clay and machine toolgroups its
downward movement was accompanied by a decline in the es-
timated normal, but its decline was greater than that of
the estimated normal. and its level was decidedly lower.
The ratios plotted in Charts 6 to 10 are ratios of
aggregates, against which it may be argued that the in-
fluence of the larger companies in the sample has more
weight than that of thesmaller, and that the relative
Influence of anindividual company mayvary significant-
ly duringthe period.While theseratiosofaggrcgates
are, inessence, the properly weighted averagesof the
ratios for the individual companies, the relative weights
nay vary somewhat through the period. Ratios of aggre-
gates were employed here because the open-end classes in
the available frequency distributions precluded the cal-
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ly ind.terwinate because of the necessity of interpojat..
ing within frequency distribution classes.
There are several reasons for believing, however,
that. the movements shi bythe ratios plotted in these
charts ar. representative not only of the sanpleC0j-
niesin theaggregate, but also of the particular enter.
prises. Inthe firstplace, the companies in the samples
ar. all relatively small; most had total assets between
$50,000 and 4150,000, with only a few over the $200,000
level. Therefore there was not the opportunity - found
in some simpleaggregatiofls of financial statements-
for the influence of one or a few cxnpeinies to outweigh
that. of a great many other. concerns in the group.It i
thisfactor, incidentally, which provides the basis for
the representativenessof much of the analysisin the
preceding chapters o1 this study.
Secondly, a special tally of the ratiosofthe par-
ticular companie. inthe samples of discontinuances re-
vealed that the great majority in each group evidenceda
downward movemeit similar to that shown in thechart.. A
count was iaade of the nwther of companies in each sample
for which the given ratio fell with no more than two in-
terruptions from the simth to the first year before dis-
continuance; for some of the companiesthere was no in-
terruption,andthe majority had only one.The results,
ecpre seed as a percentage of the nuper of companiesin
each swapl., are presented herewith.It can,be seen that
the proportion of companies recordingwhatmay be called
a persistentdecline ranged from51 percent (net worth
to total debt in th. men's clothing group)to76 percent
(net working capital to totalassets in furniture).In
most of the samples from three-fifthstothree-fourths
of the companies experienced theindicated decline.The
comparativelyri 1proportionsforthe men' s ciothin
sample accord with our earlierobservation, based on the
C.srrsnt £u.t Nut lor*Ilj
L.b1rtt
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charts, thatthe portents for thisgroup were less well marked than those for the othersamples.
For the Companies that showedmore than two inter- ruptions the givenratio sometime, declinedmarkedly, sometimesremaineci fairly stable andoccasionally rose in the fifth and fourth years beforediscontinuance and
then plunged downward.In each sample a hai4ful of com-
panies experienced a persistent risein the ratio,indi- cating that these discontinuance,were the voluntary liq-
uidationsentioned earlier.There appear to have been four or fiveof these companies in each sample.If it.
could be established that they, and theyalone, were vol-
untary- liquidationi, their elimination from these samples
wouldfurther sharpen the contrastspicturedin Charts 6 to 10.
A final reason for trusting the movements shown by
the ratios in these charts is provided by the fact that
crudely calculated meanratios giveasimilar picture.
Thea. meanratios are characterized as"crudely calcu-
]ated" becausethe assumed midpoint of the open-end class
was held constant.Thus calculated,themean ratios de-
cline slightly less than the ratios of aggregates shown
in the charts.Bu if the midpoints of the open-endand
next lowerclasseshadbeen moderately adjusteddownward
as th. last yearfore discontinuance approached,the
mean ratios wouldhavefallenequally as sharply asthe
ratios ofaggregat-33;and thereis everyreason to be-
11ev. that the central tendencies of these upper classes
in the frequency d.tributions actually underwent such a
decline.
Th. factthatthe mean ratios declined coimiensurate-
1.y withtheratios of aggregates shown in the charts in-
dicates merely that thedownward movementwas not brought
about solely by the large companies.Itwould stillbe
theoretically possible for the mean ratios to decline and
the particularcompany ratios to fluctuateerratically
overthe distribution.That this did not occur is indi-
cated by the foregoing tabulation, showing thatthe ra-
tios for the msjority of companies declined persistently.
Thus far we have seenthatfor thediscontinuing com-
panies as a group the three ratios were lower, at least
fromthe fifth year andusuallyfrom thesixth year be-fore discontinuance, thanthe estimated normals for the
surviving companies as a group.But tLieae comparisons can
tefl nothing about the rangeof variation inthe ratjos
of the companies withineach group.Such information is
presented in Chart U, whichshows, foreach ratio and
each industry, how thediscontiflUifli cømpanies were dis-
tributed in the last year beforediscontinuance according
to various ratio levels,and also the percentage distri-
bution of the continuing companiesaccording to the cor-.
responding estimated normals. It isevident, as would be
expected, that a greater proportion ofdiscontinuing than
of continuing companies had the moreadverse ratios -
those in the lowest two levelsdistinguished here.
But it should notbe overlookedthat there is a con-
siderable area of overlap between the two groups of com-
panies. Inmen's clothing, for exanple, about 40 percent
of the discontinuingcompanies had a ratio ofcurrent
assets tocurrent liabilities rangingbetween 1and 4,
while only slightLy more than 50 percentofthe continu-
ing companies had estimated normal ratios railing within
this range; and two-fifths of these discontinuing compa-
nies had a ratio as high as 0.4 or morefor net working
ca3ita].to total. assets, whileas high a proportion of
continuing as of discontinuingmen' sclothingcompanies
had positive net working capital below thc 0.4 level. In
other words, there is no clearly marked dividing Line be-
tween the ratios for the continuing and the discontinuing
companies. Some companies in the samples survived through
1936 with relatively poor ratios, while otheri with rela-
tively good ratios went outofexistence before that year.
Ait obvious inferencethat might bedrawn from the
foregoing analysis is that these three ratios may provide
an acceptable criterion for a credit analyst in evaluat-
POOTISOTES FOR OAftT 11
sed on unpublished tabls prepared by theInco.e Tax Study,aPA
project sponsored by the Trmaa.ry Departisent.The estimated normisi reLic,
uMch ferns thbasis for each distribution of continuing coanie,, is the
seigtlted average of these companies' ratics for the various calendar year
cc.ain.d in the first year before discontlnii.nc.; for methcd ofestimate
see Appendin 0.
k/The stoma-clay andaacne tool distributions of discontinuing conpa-
mien are exclusive of. ta, corporations that reported neither current as-
sets nor culTent liabLlities.
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in first Year Before Discontinuance, by Three Se-
lected Ratios for Discontinuing Companies and by
Corresponding Estimated Normal
ii Ratios forContinuing Companies&
C.MI1II
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lstg the tendencies .dtibited by an individual enterprise.
Such an infer.nc., however, cannot be fully substantiated
from the data in their available torn. To juatifsuch a
conclusion the material presented here should be
mented by a mor. detailed study based on individual com..
pairatios rather than on aggregates. It seems probable
that values of the ratios lower than the estimated nor-.
sal may bc acc.pted as portents of discontinuance. But it
has not been possible to determine Wether the proportion
of companies sthibiting a persistent decline differs sig-
nificantly between thecontinuingand the discontinuing
groups.
Chart U brings out stilt another point that should
be stressed at this Junctureto avoid misinterpretation
of our analysis.It will be seen that in each industry
there wassomeail proportion of discontinuing compa-
rues with credit ratios thatre highunder cust nary
tandards of credit appraisal.The companies with these
high ratios say have been the ones that discontinued op-
erations voluntarily. We stressed at the outset that for
the present samples there was no means of distinguiahin
the voluntary from the involuntary discontinuances.Be-
canse of this absence of informationon the reason tor
discontinuance, itseemed unduly arbitrary to elind.nate
t.nese companies from the sample.While their presence in
the sample calls for caution in interpreting the findings,
it strengthens the contention that the adverse movements
of the three NsensitiveN credit ratios are significant
portents of discontinuance.Chart U also indicates that
some of the continuing canies had amazingly poor cred-
it ratios. Whether suchconditionspersisted is not known,
but theymay wsU have dons so in some instances. In oth-
er words, a poor credit ratiois no more asufficier.L
than it is a necessary cunctttion of discontinuance.
Inite or aU the necessaryquailfications there
are important implications in theforegoing analysis.
The present samples give clear evidence that in general
thefinancialstructure of thediscontinuing companies
as a group began to deviate from that of the surviving
companiesasearly as six years before actual discppear-.
ance. Moreover, most of these deviations between the two
groupsof canies beceincreasinglymarked as tne
time of disappearance approached. Theindications of dis-
appearance were relatively definite in four of the indus-Portents of DIsContinNanCe
tries, but not so marked in the r'naining industry, men' s
clothing. This exception isprobably due to the fact that
the existence ofall-scale men'a clothing companies is
generally precarious.Thedemand for their products is
whimsic$l if not capricious, and style and fabric changes
ii..introduced too suddenly for the comfortof the en-
trepreneur.And after one or two unsuccessful. seasons a
clothing campny is nearexhaustion, for resistance to
forces of economic contraction or deflation is not so ss-
tamed as in, say, the baking industry, where the owners'
equity an1 the investment in fixed property are coompara-
tively large.
So far as credit analysis theory is concerned - the
primary assumptions of which it has beenthe purpose of
this chapter to test - our analysis has led tothe con-
ciusion thatdeviation of certain credit ratios froo an
empirically-determined level has definite diagnostic val-
ue.in other words, if the ratio persists in moving in an
adverse direction, that movementis portentous of busi-
ness discontinuance.This does not mean that acompany
having this financial experience wil] inevitably and nec-
essarily discontinue operations.It does signify, how-
ever, thatan unhealthy condition isdeveloping which,
unless corrected, will result in business discontinuance.'
Thelength of the period during which the financial
structure of these companies gave indications of approach-
ing discontinuance is a factor of particularimportance
for business cycle analysisuccause it reflects the ex.-
Osv.ld I. eayh Director -Thu .s.l. contains cpaMe3 that
vebtari]3 as v.11 a. ewepaniss that discontinued invulun-
tartly.!wn if the ,.luatarilydisconti(irC euro .Uminatud,
thjana'ysisdaisnot etsjs that M7 C(W7 .jip.risncinC anunfavol'-
1e now.iat of sor .)1 of thswe threeeansitivucreditthdlCStOI9
is == rily destined to4L*COntInIioperstiani.The author doe. not.
.teeaseafficlestly that un ugilavossble dreelopeentu occur viny thing,
can hsip* in $ cvipeito reestablish a .oiviu1s-fiuctianiJig .nt.rpriss.
Per colitis, it happeni at tivi. that a ecny chan5esfry solvency to
thsolvunq with .t.rt1inrapidity.Unr.coaflhlsd ussiol..ses unCover each
other -spiral with increasing speed.
All that can pucpsrljr be 4 ftc. the data ors.nt.d is that cred-
it ratio. are as inportantluvintin forecast.ind th.ontisivance or di.-
osntimaavce of Mdivida.l uat.sprio.a, nod thatweak cvipsnics frequently
*es .is of distress several years inedvanre of their rorval discontin-
wanes.Thea. facts are alre.dy gsnsrslli recognizsd.snd the further jar-
tint cosreberaties offered in this chapter doesnot .it.srialli add to our
hasel.dgu of the subject.